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A government employee reports her co-workers’ misconduct to 
her supervisor, and then the supervisor retaliates against her for 
reporting. This fact pattern gives rise to cases in which public 
employees argue that their supervisors violated their First Amendment 
right to free speech.1 When a government employee exercises her First 
Amendment right to free speech, federal law protects her from 
retaliation by her government employer.2 However, the First 
Amendment does not protect all speech that a public employee may 
make. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the United States Supreme Court held 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; A.B., 2001, Princeton University. I am grateful to Professor Harold 
Morris, Paul Forster, Andrew Dorn, Scott Blake, Viktoria Ziebarth, Diana Rdzanek, 
and Richard Kaplan for their helpful feedback, and to Samuel Van Dellen for his 
support. I am solely responsible for any mistakes and omissions. 
1 E.g., Milwaukee Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Clarke, 574 F.3d 370, 372–75 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (deputy sheriff alleged that sheriff violated his First Amendment rights by 
reassigning him to a more dangerous patrol in retaliation for criticizing the sheriff’s 
misuse of public resources). 
2 Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating the elements of 
a prima facie case for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
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that when a public employee speaks pursuant to her official duties, she 
is speaking as a government employee and not as a citizen, and the 
First Amendment does not protect her speech from employer 
discipline.3  
Since Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has decided 
the question whether a public employee spoke pursuant to his official 
duties as a matter of law.4 The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that 
a public employee’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment 
whenever the employee’s job duties arguably included the kind of 
speech at issue.5 Treating the question as purely legal is problematic 
because it hides questions of fact. First, what were the employee’s job 
duties? Second, did the employee speak because of those duties? 
Because the Seventh Circuit treats this inquiry as purely legal, it has 
affirmed summary judgment against public employee plaintiffs, even 
when they argued that their job duties really did not include making 
the kind of speech at issue or that a jury should decide this question.6 
By treating the matter as a question of law, the Seventh Circuit is 
depriving plaintiffs of the opportunity to prove facts that are key to 
protecting their constitutional right to free speech. 
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusions on this issue also appear 
questionable. The court’s opinions do not always make clear how it 
came to the conclusion that the employee spoke pursuant to the job.  
Therefore, a reader of the opinion cannot tell whether the court’s 
assessment of the plaintiff’s job duties is correct. By affirming 
summary judgment against the plaintiff, the court prevents the fact-
finding that would answer this question. On the other hand, treating 
the questions of the scope of a public employee’s job duties and 
whether the employee spoke because of those duties as questions of 
fact would assure plaintiffs a fair resolution of their claims and would 
assure the public that the result of these cases is correct. Treating the 
                                                 
3 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
4 E.g., Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 602 F.3d 852, 862 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
5 E.g., Davis v. Cook Cnty., 534 F.3d 650, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2008). 
6 E.g., id. 
460 
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question as one of fact would not require more of the courts’ time in 
many cases because courts would grant summary judgment against 
plaintiffs who could not create a genuine issue of material fact on this 
point. 
 Because employee free speech cases are brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, Part I provides a brief introduction to that statute. Part II 
summarizes the development of public employee free speech doctrine 
to show how Garcetti changed the inquiry. Part III surveys the 
reasoning of federal appellate courts, some of which have held that the 
scope of a public employee’s job duties is a question of fact, and some 
of which have continued to treat the entire inquiry as one of law. Part 
IV discusses the benefits to be gained by treating the question whether 
a public employee spoke because of her official duties as a question of 
fact and suggests a way to reach this result in the Seventh Circuit.  
 
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, THE CIVIL REMEDY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
 
When courts consider the First Amendment rights of public 
employees, they usually do so in the context of a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.7 This statute creates a civil cause of action for people 
whose constitutional or other legal rights have been violated by a state 
actor apparently acting with official authority.8 Section 1983 states in 
relevant part: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
                                                 
7 E.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138 (1983). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 2:1 (4th ed. 2009). 
461 
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laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .9 
 
For example, the Constitution protects the right to be free of 
unreasonable searches.10 Suppose that on-duty police officers search 
someone’s home without a warrant. Those police officers are acting 
“under color of law.” That is, they are misusing the power given to 
them by law, and they are able to perform this illegal search only 
because they appear to be acting with the authority of the state.11 But 
by searching the home without a warrant, the officers have actually 
deprived the victim of a Constitutional right.12 In this situation, § 1983 
gives the victim an opportunity to sue the police officers for money 
damages.13 These money damages can be nominal, compensatory 
and/or punitive.14 Successful plaintiffs may also be awarded attorney’s 
fees.15 
                                                 
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated . . . .”). 
11 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). 
12 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (searches and seizures inside a 
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable). 
13 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168–172 (1961), overruled on other 
grounds by Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) 
(holding that municipalities are not immune from § 1983 liability when their policy 
or custom violates constitutional or legal rights). In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiffs stated a claim under § 1983 where they alleged that 
police officers had broken into their home without a warrant, forced them to stand 
naked in the living room while police ransacked the house and damaged personal 
property, and detained one of them for ten hours without charging him with a crime. 
Id. at 169. 
14 The amount of money damages in § 1983 cases is generally determined in 
the same way as in tort cases. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 
306 (1986). In order to be awarded compensatory damages, a plaintiff must prove an 
injury that resulted from the deprivation of rights. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 
112 (1992). Where the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights but the plaintiff 
suffered no injury, nominal damages may be awarded. See id. Punitive damages may 
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In § 1983 cases, plaintiffs generally must sue the individual 
responsible for the violation, not that individual’s employer.16 The 
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 cases, so that 
government bodies are not liable under § 1983 solely because of the 
conduct of one of their employees.17 A government body may be liable 
only if its policy statement, ordinance, regulation, official decision, or 
custom causes a violation of a constitutional right.18 
Government employees can and do use § 1983 to seek 
compensation when they feel that their employers deprived them of 
their First Amendment right to free speech.19 Employees of the 
government, like the general public, have First Amendment rights. As 
the Seventh Circuit has stated, “a public employee does not shed his 
First Amendment rights at the steps of the government building.”20 
Retaliation by a government employer for an employee’s speech has 
been found to violate the employee’s First Amendment rights.21  
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, a 
public employee must present evidence that: (1) her speech was 
protected by the First Amendment, (2) her employer has caused her to 
suffer a deprivation likely to deter free speech, and (3) her speech was 
at least a motivating factor in the employer's action.22 Thus in every 
§ 1983 public employee free speech case, the court must consider 
whether the speech was protected by the First Amendment. 
                                                                                                                   
be awarded where a defendant intentionally or recklessly disregarded the plaintiff’s 
rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).  
15 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006). 
16 See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 690–91. 
19 See cases cited infra note 130. 
 20 Vargas-Harrison v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 964, 970 (7th Cir. 
2001); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–606 (1967) (“[T]he theory 
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any 
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 21 E.g., Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 22 Id. 
463 
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II. HOW GARCETTI CHANGED THE INQUIRY 
 
 Before Garcetti, the settled rule for deciding whether a public 
employee’s speech was protected by the First Amendment was the 
“Pickering-Connick test,” from the Supreme Court cases, Pickering v. 
Board of Education23 and Connick v. Myers.24 In these cases, the 
Supreme Court sought to balance two competing values: (1) the 
employee’s interest in expressing himself on a matter of public 
concern, just as any other citizen could, and (2) the public body’s 
interest in providing services as efficiently as possible, which includes 
controlling how its employees spend their time and how its employees 
represent it to the public.25 
In Pickering, a teacher was fired for sending a letter to a local 
newspaper.26 The letter criticized the School Board’s and the 
Superintendent’s spending priorities and their attempts to silence 
criticism from teachers.27 The Court began its analysis of the case with 
this language: “The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.”28 To balance the interests, the Court considered the 
content of the letter and whether it dealt with matters of public concern 
(it did), and whether the speech actually disrupted the functioning of 
the school or the teacher’s job performance (it did not).29 Concluding 
that the school district had no legitimate interest in silencing this 
speech, the Court held that the teacher’s letter was protected speech, 
                                                 
23 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
24 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 25 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
26 Id. at 564. 
27 Id. at 564, 569, 575–78. 
28 Id. at 568. 
29 Id. at 569–71. 
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and therefore, the school could not constitutionally dismiss the teacher 
for writing the letter.30  
Connick v. Myers was the next step in the development of public 
employee free speech doctrine.31 When Myers, an Assistant District 
Attorney, was told that she was to be transferred to a different section 
of the criminal court, she told her supervisors that she opposed this 
transfer.32 After she was told that she was being transferred anyway, 
she distributed a questionnaire to fifteen other Assistant District 
Attorneys.33 The questionnaire asked for her colleagues’ opinions 
about the transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance 
committee, the level of confidence in several individually named 
supervisors, and whether the colleagues felt pressured to work in 
political campaigns.34 Myers’s supervisor considered this an act of 
insubordination and fired her.35  
Myers sued her employer, alleging that it had violated § 1983 by 
retaliating against her for exercising her right to free speech.36 To 
determine whether the questionnaire was protected, the Court first 
asked whether the questionnaire addressed a matter of public 
concern.37 The Court held that the First Amendment protects a public 
employee from employer retaliation when she speaks “as a citizen 
upon matters of public concern,” but not when she speaks “as an 
employee upon matters only of personal interest.”38 The question 
whether speech addresses a matter of public concern is to be 
                                                 
30 Id. at 574–75. 
31 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
32 Id. at 140. 
33 Id. at 140–41. 
34 Id. at 141, 155. 
35 Id. at 141. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 146. 
38 Id. at 147; but see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 
1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[S]peech even if 
characterized as private is entitled to constitutional protection when it does not in 
any way interfere with the employer's business.”). 
465 
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determined by considering the “content, form, and context” of the 
speech, “as revealed by the whole record.”39  
In Connick, the Court held that all but one of the questions in 
Myers’s questionnaire concerned only Myers’s own dissatisfaction 
with her circumstances, which the Court considered private, not 
public.40 However, the question whether her colleagues ever felt 
pressured to work on political campaigns did touch on a matter of 
public concern.41 With regard to that question, the Court applied the 
“Pickering balance,” weighing Myers’s interest in distributing the 
questionnaire against the government’s interest in not having the 
District Attorney’s office disrupted.42 The Court found the employer’s 
interest weightier and held that the First Amendment did not protect 
Myers from being fired for distributing her questionnaire.43 
In Connick, the Court stated that the “inquiry into the protected 
status of speech is one of law, not fact.” 44 Using the rules from 
Pickering and Connick to determine whether public employee speech 
was protected by the First Amendment, federal courts considered the 
facts of the case and then decided as a matter of law: (1) whether the 
speech at issue touched on a matter of public concern, and if so, 
(2) whether the employee’s interest in speaking outweighed the 
employer’s interest in efficient functioning.45 Both of these questions 
are the kind that courts answer as a matter of law. In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, the Supreme Court changed the inquiry by requiring 
consideration of more facts: what the employee’s job duties were, and 
whether the speech in question was made pursuant to those duties.46 
                                                 
39 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
40 Id. at 148–49. 
41 Id. at 149. 
42 Id. at 150–54. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 148 n.7. 
45 See, e.g., Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying “the 
Connick-Pickering test”), rev’d, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007) (after Garcetti, the 
Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment for plaintiff because the plaintiff spoke 
pursuant to her job). 
46 See 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
466 
8
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW            Volume 5, Issue 2             Spring 2010 
 
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court held that a deputy district 
attorney was not speaking as a citizen when he brought potential 
police misconduct to the attention of his superiors.47 Ceballos, a 
Deputy District Attorney, was asked by a defense attorney to review an 
affidavit that the police had used to get a search warrant critical to a 
pending case.48 Ceballos concluded that the affidavit contained serious 
misrepresentations.49 For example, after he visited a road referred to in 
the affidavit, Ceballos doubted that the affiant could have seen tire 
marks because of the texture of the road surface.50 He told his 
supervisors what he thought was false about the affidavit, and then he 
wrote a disposition memorandum recommending that the case be 
dismissed.51 
Ceballos’s supervisors decided to proceed with the case, and 
Ceballos testified in court about his personal observations, which 
differed from the statements in the affidavit.52 After these events, 
Ceballos was reassigned to another position, transferred to another 
courthouse, and denied a promotion.53 Ceballos sued his supervisors, 
alleging that they violated § 1983 by retaliating against him for his 
disposition memorandum, which he claimed was protected by the First 
Amendment.54 
 The Supreme Court held that public employees are not speaking 
as citizens for the purpose of First Amendment protection when they 
speak pursuant to their official duties.55 Ceballos did write his 
memorandum pursuant to his official duties, which included the duty 
to make recommendations about how to proceed with pending cases.56 
                                                 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 413. 
49 Id. at 414. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 414–15. 
53 Id. at 415. 
54 Id. 
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Therefore, regardless of any personal reasons Ceballos might have had 
for writing the memorandum the way he did, his § 1983 claim failed.57 
After Garcetti, circuit courts have developed rules to define the 
meaning of “pursuant to their official duties”58 as applied to new 
circumstances.59 A detailed discussion of the various circuit courts’ 
rules is beyond the scope of this Note. Generally, several circuit courts 
have stated that speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties 
is speech that “owes its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities.”60 Several circuit courts have defined this standard 
broadly, holding that an employee speaks pursuant to his job when he 
speaks because of any of his job duties, even one that is “an unusual 
aspect of an employee’s job that is not part of his everyday 
functions.”61 The Seventh Circuit asks whether an employee spoke 
pursuant to her official obligations, “including both her day-to-day 
duties and her more general responsibilities.”62 
Federal courts have stopped short of holding that all speech by 
public employees that could conceivably promote the interests of their 
employers is made “pursuant to their official duties.” For example, an 
employee’s filing a grievance could potentially help the employer by 
pointing out systemic problems that, if solved, would make the 
employer more effective. However, where there is no specific 
requirement to report, courts generally do not find that filing an 
employee grievance is speech made pursuant to the job.63 The Tenth 
Circuit explained that to consider a generalized grievance policy to be 
                                                 
57 See id. at 426. 
58 Id. at 421. 
59 E.g., Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2008). 
60 E.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421); Huppert v. City of Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 704 (9th Cir. 
2009) (same); Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(same); cf. Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 
public employee’s speech was not protected because it was “part of the job”). 
61 Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 714 (10th Cir. 2010). 
62 Trigillo, 547 F.3d at 829. 
63 E.g., Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1204 
(10th Cir. 2007). 
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an official duty would “eviscerat[e] Garcetti and the general 
constitutional principle that public employees do not surrender all their 
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”64  
The remainder of this Note focuses on how courts determine what 
speech is made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties. The 
Supreme Court left that question open in Garcetti.65 In Garcetti, the 
Court needed no help from a fact-finder to determine the scope of 
Ceballos’s job duties and whether the speech fell within that scope 
because Ceballos agreed that he did write the memorandum pursuant 
to his job duties.66 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted 
that the Court “ha[d] no occasion to articulate a comprehensive 
framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases 
where there is room for serio 67us debate.”  
                                                
Justice Kennedy seems to have implied that fact-finding would be 
needed in future cases where parties do dispute the employee’s job 
duties and whether the employee spoke because of those duties.68 He 
wrote that the Court rejected the idea that employers could insulate 
themselves from free speech retaliation cases simply by writing 
excessively broad job descriptions.69 Rather, “[t]he proper inquiry is a 
practical one.”70 The Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether the 
question is legal or factual (or both) because a dispute over whether a 
public employee’s duties included making the speech at issue has not 







64 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
65 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
66 Id. at 421, 424. 
 67 Id. at 424. 
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III. THE CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER THE QUESTION IS 
ONE OF FACT OR LAW. 
 
 Most Circuit courts treat the entire inquiry into whether the First 
Amendment protects speech as purely legal, but the Ninth and Third 
Circuits recognize that the inquiry includes a question of fact. 
 
A. Question of Fact 
 
The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the inquiry into 
whether a public employee’s speech is protected can contain factual 
questions that will be submitted to a jury. 
At the time of this writing, the Ninth Circuit was the only circuit 
to have discussed in depth the question “whether the inquiry into the 
protected status of speech remains one purely of law as stated in 
Connick,” or whether Garcetti has introduced a question of fact into 
the inquiry.71 In Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 84, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the “scope and content of a plaintiff’s job 
responsibilities” is a question of fact.72  
In this case, Posey was a “security specialist” at a high school.73 
After the school cut back his responsibilities, he wrote a letter to the 
School District expressing his concerns that its safety and emergency 
policies were inadequate to prevent an emergency, such as a student’s 
bringing a gun to school.74 At the end of that school year, Posey’s job 
was consolidated with other jobs to form a new position.75 Posey 
applied for that position but was not hired.76 
                                                 
71 Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127–29 (9th 
Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit reiterated this view in later cases, including Robinson 
v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2009). 
72 Posey, 546 F.3d at 1129. 
73 Id. at 1123–24. 
74 Id. at 1124. 
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Posey argued that his responsibilities were limited to “discrete 
tasks such as ensuring that the parking lot remained orderly at the end 
of the school day,” and therefore he wrote his letter as a citizen and not 
in his capacity as a security specialist.77 The school district argued that 
Posey’s responsibilities included providing “reports and information 
about security matters at the high school,” and therefore, Posey wrote 
the letter pursuant to his official duties.78 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that the dispute required the court to decide whether the question at 
hand was a question of law or fact.79 
The Ninth Circuit held that the question whether Posey’s job 
duties included making the kind of report he made in his letter was a 
question of fact.80 The court found that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the scope of Posey’s job and reversed the 
grant of summary judgment for the school district.81  
The court reasoned that the scope and content of a plaintiff’s job 
responsibilities can be found through the usual method of fact-finding, 
that is, by applying “ordinary principles of logic and common 
experience.”82 Therefore, courts must reserve judgment until the facts 
are found by a fact-finder.83 The court called the question of the scope 
of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities “concrete and practical rather than 
abstract and formal.”84 It also noted that the Supreme Court in 
Garcetti anticipated a factual inquiry when it said that “[t]he proper 
inquiry is a practical one” in which the employee’s actual job dutie
would be more important than a formal job descr 85
s 
iption.  
                                                 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1127. 
80 Id. at 1129. 
81 Id. at 1131. 
82 Id. at 1129 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 
485, 501 n.17 (1984)). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006)). 
471 
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In defense of its holding, the court pointed out that not all cases 
will require a trial, even where there is a factual dispute over whether 
speech was made pursuant to official job duties.86 Summary judgment 
would still be proper where the speech did not address a matter of 
public concern, or where the government’s interest in efficient 
functioning outweighed the employee’s interest in speaking.87 
The Third Circuit has held that the question whether a public 
employee spoke pursuant to his official duties is a mixed question of 
fact and law.88 A mixed question of fact and law has been defined as a 
“question[] in which the historical facts are admitted or established, 
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy 
the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law 
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.”89 For this 
reason, the Third Circuit has required the facts in public employee free 
speech cases to be established before it would decide whether or not a 
public employee spoke pursuant to his job duties.90 
The Third Circuit first discussed this issue in Foraker v. 
Chaffinch, where it explained that the question “whether a particular 
incident of speech is made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties” 
involves a fact-intensive inquiry.91 The court reasoned that a court can 
determine whether the plaintiff spoke pursuant to his job duties only 
after the facts regarding the speech and the plaintiff’s job duties have 
been found.92 In this case, the facts were presented in detail at a jury 
trial, and the appellate court considered the record “comprehensive.”93 
With complete factual information available, the Third Circuit 
determined that the plaintiffs had spoken within their official duties 
                                                 
86 See id. at 1129. 
87 See id. at 1123, 1129. 
88 Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2007). 
89 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). 
90 See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240. 
91 Foraker, 501 F.3d at 240. 
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and affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to 
the defendants.94 The Third Circuit also suggested that because of the 
nature of the question whether a public employee spoke pursuant to 
his job, appellate courts should defer to district courts to resolve this 
question because district courts are more familiar with the evidence.95 
In Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, the Third Circuit reiterated its 
holding that the question is a mixed question of fact and law.96 In that 
case, a police officer alleged that his superiors retaliated against him 
for his part in an investigation of another police officer, including 
testifying against him at trial.97 The trial took place before the 
Supreme Court decided Garcetti, and none of the fact-finding focused 
on whether the plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his job.98 The 
court stated that the record contained insufficient factual details about 
the plaintiff’s participation in the investigation and his related job 
duties, so that the court could not determine whether that speech was 
made pursuant to his official duties without more factual findings.99  
 
B. Question of Law 
 
The First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh 
and D.C. Circuits have treated the question whether a public employee 
spoke pursuant to her official duties as a question of law. 
The Fifth Circuit case, Charles v. Grief, illustrates such 
treatment.100 In that case, Charles was a systems analyst for the Texas 
Lottery Commission.101 He sent an e-mail to high-ranking 
                                                 
94 Id. at 247. 
95 Id. at 240–41. 
96 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008). 
97 Id. at 224. 
98 Id. at 225, 227. 
99 See id. at 227–28 (“We agree that some aspects of [plaintiff’s] speech in the 
context of the . . . investigation require further factual development by the District 
Court.”). 
100 See 522 F.3d 508, 512, 513 n.17 (5th Cir. 2008). 
101 Id. at 509–10. 
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Commission officials complaining about racial discrimination 
occurring at the Commission.102 A month later, he had received no 
response.103 Charles then sent the e-mail to members of the Texas 
Legislature who had supervisory authority over the Commission.104 
He also sent the legislators e-mail messages in which he accused t
Commission of violating the Texas Open Records Act and other 
misconduct.
he 
                                                
105 Charles was fired two days later.106 He sued Mr. Grief, 
the supervisor who had fired him, alleging that Grief had retaliated 
against him for exercising his First Amendment rights.107 
The District Court denied Grief’s motion for summary 
judgment.108 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that as a matter of law, 
Charles’s speech was not made pursuant to his official duties.109 The 
magistrate judge’s report, on which the district court had relied, found 
that the question whether Charles’s e-mails had been written as a 
citizen or as a Commission employee was “a material issue of genuine 
fact [sic] properly resolved at trial.”110 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, 
holding that “even though analyzing whether Garcetti applies involves 
the consideration of factual circumstances surrounding the speech at 
issue, the question whether Charles’s speech is entitled to protection is 
a legal conclusion properly decided at summary judgment.”111 The 
court considered the facts in the record before it, including that 
Charles had communicated directly with legislators rather than using 
an internal grievance process, and that Charles’s job was to maintain 
the Commission’s computer network.112 The court concluded that 
 







109 Id. at 514. 
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Charles’s complaint about racial discrimination and other misconduct 
could not be related to “any conceivable job duties” of a computer 
systems analyst.113 
The opinion includes no discussion of why the Fifth Circuit 
considers the question to be one of law.114 It simply states that the 
question whether speech is protected is a purely legal one, and cites 
Connick (an important pre-Garcetti decision) and an earlier Fifth 
Circuit case that similarly provided no discussion of this issue.115 
The Tenth Circuit made a similar decision in Brammer-Hoelter v. 
Twin Peaks Charter Academy.116 In that case, the Tenth Circuit stated 
that the question whether an employee’s speech was made pursuant to 
his official duties is a question of law.117 The court did not discuss its 
reasoning on this point.118 It simply stated that the question is a legal 
one, and cited a pre-Garcetti Tenth Circuit case for support.119 The 
court then decided as a matter of law which of several complaints by 
teachers were made pursuant to the teachers’ official duties. 120  
The Tenth Circuit upheld its conclusion that the question is a legal 
one in several later cases.121 Some of these cases provide clues about 
the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. In Thomas v. City of Blanchard, the 
court stated that in First Amendment cases, the court has “an 
obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in 
order to make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 512–14. 
115 Id. at 512 n.7 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983) and 
Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692–94 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
116 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007). 
117 Id. at 1203 (stating that the whether the employee spoke pursuant to her 
official duties is “to be resolved by the district court,” not the trier of fact).  
118 Id. 
119 Id. (citing Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
120 Id. at 1203–05. 
121 Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 745 (10th Cir. 
2010); Thomas v. City of Blanchard, 548 F.3d 1317, 1322 (10th Cir. 2008); Hesse v. 
Town of Jackson, Wyo., 541 F.3d 1240, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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intrusion on the field of free expression.”122 The court did not apply 
this principle specifically to the question whether a public employee’s 
speech was made pursuant to his official duties but rather to the entire 
inquiry into whether speech is protected.123 
The Eighth Circuit held that the entire inquiry into whether a 
public employee’s speech is protected is a legal one in McGee v. 
Public Water Supply.124 The D.C. Circuit agreed in Wilburn v. 
Robinson,125 and the First Circuit agreed in Curran v. Cousins.126 
Without stating explicitly that the question was a legal one, the Second 
Circuit held as a matter of law that a public employee spoke pursuant 
to her employment in Huth v. Haslun.127 The Sixth Circuit did the 
same in Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio,128 as did the Eleventh 





                                                 
122 Thomas, 548 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)). 
123 See id. 
124 471 F.3d 918, 920 (8th Cir. 2006); see Benjamin M. Smith, Note, 
Transforming the Public Employee Speech Standard in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille: 
More than Meets the Eye, 2010 BYU L. REV. 285, 295, 295 n.70 (2010) (discussing 
the circuit split and listing McGee and more recent Eighth Circuit cases that treat the 
question as one of law). 
125 480 F.3d 1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the question whether a 
public employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern is a question of law 
for the court, and citing for support Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639 (D.C. Cir. 
1994)).  
126 509 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7 for 
the proposition that “[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, 
not fact”). 
127 598 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We have no difficulty concluding that 
[the] speech was made not as a ‘citizen’ but, rather, pursuant to [plaintiff’s] official 
duties . . . .”). 
128 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007). 
129 510 F.3d 1333, 1346 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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C. The Seventh Circuit 
 
As of this writing, the Seventh Circuit has decided the question 
whether a public employee had spoken pursuant to his job duties as a 
matter of law in nineteen cases since Garcetti.130 At first, the Seventh 
Circuit decided this question as a matter of law without explicitly 
stating that it was doing so. 
Mills v. City of Evansville, Indiana, decided in 2006, was the first 
Seventh Circuit case to follow Garcetti.131 In that case, the court held 
as a matter of law that when a police sergeant spoke to her superiors in 
the lobby of a police department building and criticized a plan to 
change the duties of some police officers, she did so pursuant to her 
official duties.132 The court stated, “Garcetti … holds that before 
asking whether the subject-matter of particular speech is a topic of 
public concern, the court must decide whether the plaintiff was 
speaking ‘as a citizen’ or as part of her public job.”133 If one were 
reading this opinion without the purpose of discovering whether the 
Seventh Circuit considers the question one of law or fact, and without 
the emphasis, one might not notice the implication of this language. 
                                                 
130 Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 602 F.3d 852, 862 (7th Cir. 
2010); Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2010); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 
F.3d 518, 523 (7th Cir. 2009); Matrisciano v. Randle, 569 F.3d 723, 731 (7th Cir. 
2009); Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F.3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2009); Nagle v. Vill. of 
Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 123 (7th Cir. 2009); Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 
480, 491 (7th Cir. 2008); Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 2008); 
Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 775 (7th Cir. 2008); Davis v. Cook Cnty., 534 
F.3d 650, 653-54 (7th Cir. 2008); Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1092 (7th 
Cir. 2008); Callahan v. Fermon, 526 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2008); Vose v. 
Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 2007); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 597 
(7th Cir. 2007); Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 2007); 
Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007); Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 
464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 
2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006). 
131 See Mills, 452 F.3d at 647. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 647 (emphasis added). 
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There is no indication that the plaintiff in Mills argued that her 
statements were not made pursuant to her job.134 Rather, because 
Garcetti was decided while this case was under advisement, it appears 
that neither plaintiff nor defendants had any opportunity to argue this 
point.135 Based on its own assessment of the facts, the Seventh Circuit 
held that the speech was not protected and affirmed summary 
judgment for the defendants.136 
The Seventh Circuit first stated that the inquiry is one of law in 
Spiegla v. Hull, decided in 2007.137 In Spiegla, the plaintiff was a 
correctional officer who guarded the front gate of an Indiana prison.138 
The plaintiff saw two other correctional officers transfer bags from 
their personal vehicles into a state vehicle in the parking lot outside of 
the main gate.139 The officers then drove the state vehicle to the 
plaintiff’s security post.140 Although the prison’s policy was to search 
all entering vehicles without exception for contraband, the plaintiff did 
not search this vehicle because her supervisor told her not to.141 Later 
that day, the plaintiff reported this apparent breach of prison policy.142 
She was then transferred to a less desirable shift.143 
The plaintiff’s appeal turned on whether her reporting was 
protected speech.144 The Seventh Circuit stated that the “inquiry into 
the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.”145 Besides 
                                                 
134 See id. at 647–48. 
135 See id. at 647. 
136 See id. at 648. 
137 481 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2007). 
138 Id. at 962. 
139 Id. at 962–63. 




144 Id. at 965 (because Garcetti was decided while this case was under 
consideration, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered whether the plaintiff’s speech was 
protected in light of Garcetti). 
145 Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)). 
478 
20
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 6
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss2/6
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW            Volume 5, Issue 2             Spring 2010 
 
quoting Connick, the court offered no support for this conclusion.146 
Because the plaintiff was specifically required to report all breaches of 
security procedures, the court held that the speech at issue was made 
pursuant to her official duties, and it directed the district court to grant 
judgment for the defendants.147 
Like most of the other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has not 
explicitly discussed why it holds that the inquiry remains purely legal 
after Garcetti. In three cases after Spiegla, the Seventh Circuit again 
stated that the question whether a public employee’s speech is 
protected is a purely legal question.148 In each of these cases, the court 
phrased the question as whether the speech was protected by the First 
Amendment, not specifically whether the public employee spoke 
pursuant to his official duties.149 In each of these cases, the court cited 
as authority only Connick, Spiegla (which cited only Connick), and 
another pre-Garcetti Seventh Circuit case.150 In the remaining public 
                                                 
146 See id. 
147 Id. at 967. 
148 Davis v. Cook Cnty., 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008); Houskins v. 
Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 489 (7th Cir. 2008); Matrisciano v. Randle, 569 F.3d 723, 
730 (7th Cir. 2009). 
149 Davis, 534 F.3d at 653 (“[T]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is 
one of law, not fact.”); Houskins, 549 F.3d at 489 (“While we owe deference to the 
jury's resolution of the contested factual issues, the determination of whether speech 
is constitutionally protected is a question of law for the court.”); Matrisciano, 569 
F.3d at 730 (“Whether the First Amendment protects the speech is a question of law 
that we review de novo.”). The Ninth Circuit claimed that the Seventh Circuit 
implicitly sided with the circuits that hold that whether speech is made pursuant to a 
job is a question of fact. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 
1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2008). In Posey, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that in Davis, the 
Seventh Circuit held that summary judgment was appropriate because “no rational 
trier of fact could find” that Davis's speech had been made in her capacity as a 
private citizen. Id. (citing Davis, 534 F.3d at 653). However, the Seventh Circuit 
used that wording only to refute Davis’s claim that the question should be decided 
by a jury. See Davis, 534 F.3d at 653. 
150 Davis, 534 F.3d at 653 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7); Houskins, 549 
F.3d at 489 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.10 and Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 965); 
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employee free speech cases that the Seventh Circuit has decided as of 
this writing, the court has decided whether the speech at issue was 
made pursuant to the employee’s job as a matter of law without 
indicating that it was doing so.151 
 The Seventh Circuit may not have addressed the argument at least 
in part because no public employee free speech case has presented the 
court with a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee 
spoke because of his duties. Most of the cases in which the Seventh 
Circuit has had to decide whether a public employee’s speech was 
protected by the First Amendment were before that court on appeal 
from summary judgment.152 In these cases, the court found either that 
the speech was clearly outside of the scope of the employee’s job,153 
or that the plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that she had no
spoken because of her job duties.
t 
                                                
154 
 Even when plaintiffs have argued that their speech should be 
protected because it was not made pursuant to their official duties, 
they have made legal arguments, but not factual ones. Plaintiffs have 
argued that they were speaking as citizens and have characterized the 
speech as going beyond the requirements of the job, but they have 
failed to make specific factual allegations about what people in their 
 
151 E.g., Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 602 F.3d 852, 862 (7th 
Cir. 2010). At least one district court in the Seventh Circuit has treated the issue as a 
mixed question of fact and law. In Fulk v. Village of Sandoval, the Southern District 
of Illinois denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because it found the 
plaintiff had created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether at least some of 
his reporting of the defendant’s misconduct was made as a citizen outside of his 
official duties. No. 08-843-GPM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26355, at *13 (S.D. Ill. 
Mar. 19, 2010). 
152 See cases cited supra note 130. 
153 E.g., Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“Piggee's ‘speech,’ [which included placing an anti-gay religious pamphlet in the 
apron pocket of a gay student,] was not related to her job of instructing students in 
cosmetology.”). 
154 Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1092 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Ms. Tamayo 
cannot escape the strictures of Garcetti by including in her complaint the conclusory 
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positions were and were not expected to do. For example, in Bivens v. 
Trent, the plaintiff argued only law, not facts.155 
 Bivens was an Illinois State Police officer stationed at an indoor 
firing range.156 After a blood test revealed that Bivens had an elevated 
level of lead in his blood, Bivens complained to his supervisors about 
his exposure to lead at his workplace, and he filed a grievance with the 
state police union.157 He later sued his supervisors, alleging that they 
retaliated against him because of his complaints about the lead.158 
The defendants argued that Bivens’s job duties included telling his 
employer about any unsafe conditions, and that this included the 
complaint at issue.159 Bivens did not argue that expressing concerns 
about the safety of his workplace was not part of his job.160 Instead, he 
argued that the district court had improperly expanded Garcetti’s 
“pursuant to” language when it found that his speech was not 
protected because it was “related” to his duties.161 Bivens’s brief 
included the statement that “[t]here is nothing in the record that 
suggests that Bivens is somehow obligated to make a union grievance” 
about the safety of his work conditions.162 However, this sentence was 
part of an argument that the district court had erred when it held as a 
matter of law that his speech was made pursuant to his job.163 Bivens 
did not argue that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the scope of his job duties that should preclude summary judgment.164 
Bivens also argued that summary judgment should be granted 
cautiously because questions of the employer’s intent and motivation 
                                                 
155 See Initial Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Jimmy W. Bivens, Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-2256). 
156 Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 2010). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 558–59. 
159 Id. at 559. 
160 See Initial Brief of Jimmy W. Bivens, supra note 155. 
161 Id. at 13, 20. 
162 Id. at 22. 
163 Id. at 18–23. 
164 See id. 
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are inherently fact-based.165 He asked the court to preserve the right to 
a trial by jury despite the pressure of the expanding judicial 
caseload.166 Bivens related this argument only to questions of fact 
about employer intent.167 Though he could have argued that the 
question of the scope of an employee’s job duties is inherently fact-
based, he made no mention of the scope of job duties or the Garcetti 
inquiry during the course of his argument.168 He did not argue that 
there was a question of fact as to the scope of his job duties and 
whether he had complained pursuant to those duties.169 Thus, it is not 
surprising that the Seventh Circuit responded with the legal conclusion 
that Bivens’s complaints made to his superiors were made pursuant to 
his official responsibility to oversee the safety of the firing range.170 
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD TREAT THE ISSUE WHETHER A 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPOKE AS PART OF HIS JOB DUTIES AS A QUESTION 
OF FACT. 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s treatment of the entire inquiry as purely 
legal leads to some unsound decisions. This is because in order to 
determine whether or not speech was made pursuant to a plaintiff’s 
job, a court must know what the plaintiff’s official duties were. The 
Seventh Circuit has decided whether the plaintiff’s speech was 
protected even in cases where the plaintiff’s official duties may not 
have been clearly established. In such cases, the court has 
extrapolated. 
For example, in Bivens v. Trent, the court reasoned that because 
Bivens was responsible for overseeing the safety of his workplace, he 
                                                 
165 Id. at 13. 
166 Id. at 15–17. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. at 13–17. 
169 See id. at 15–23. 
170 See Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2010). The court 
concluded that the union grievance did not address a matter of public concern, and it 
therefore did not reach the question whether the union grievance was made pursuant 
to Bivens’s official duties. Id. 
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must have been acting pursuant to that responsibility when he reported 
his concerns about his own exposure to lead.171 In Vose v. Kliment, the 
court reasoned that because Vose, a police supervisor, had a 
responsibility to make sure his own unit’s work was effective, he must 
have been acting pursuant to that responsibility when he reported 
suspected misconduct of police officers in another unit, even though 
Vose argued that he was not expected to oversee officers outside of his 
own unit.172 
One of the Seventh Circuit’s most questionable decisions on this 
issue is Davis v. Cook County.173 In that case, the plaintiff, Tonya 
Davis, was a nurse in the emergency room at John H. Stroger, Jr. 
Hospital.174 Davis felt harassed by some of her colleagues, and she 
wrote a memorandum to the Hospital’s Employee Assistance 
Counselor and several hospital officials alleging that she had been 
harassed and abused by various colleagues.175 On appeal from the 
grant of summary judgment against her, Davis argued that the question 
whether she had written that memorandum pursuant to her job duties 
should be decided by a jury.176 
However, the Seventh Circuit decided that question on its own 
and affirmed the grant of summary judgment against Davis.177 It stated 
that Davis “admit[ted]” that her memorandum addressed “the 
operation of the ER” and her concern that “the ER was operating 
without any team-work and professionalism.”178 Davis’s uncontested 
job description stated that she must “take care of the patients, expedite 
the patients through the system and act as an advocate, working with 
physicians to give the best possible care.”179 From this job description, 
                                                 
171 Id. at 560. 
172 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007). 
173 534 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2008). 
174 Id. at 651. 
175 Id. at 652. 
176 Id. at 653. 
177 Id. at 653, 654. 
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the court concluded that Davis wrote her memorandum as part of her 
duty to advocate for patients.180 
 This conclusion is far from obvious. Another equally plausible 
conclusion is that nurses at Stroger Hospital are expected to advocate 
on behalf of their patients within the system but are not expected to 
complain about problems with the system itself.181 In the absence of 
any evidence that Davis’s job responsibilities included the duty to 
report problems with the work environment or with the Hospital’s 
functioning, the court’s conclusion appears unsupported.  
The extrapolations that the Seventh Circuit made in these 
examples may or may not be correct. Federal judges cannot be 
expected to know precisely what job responsibilities are assigned to 
every public employee in their jurisdiction. In some cases, the court’s 
conclusion appears to be based on the court’s notion of what the 
plaintiff’s job duties should include rather than on the employer’s 
actual expectations of the employee.182 
Treating the question as purely legal at the summary judgment 
stage deprives some plaintiffs of the opportunity to prove that their job 
duties really did not include making the kind of speech at issue. Given 
the opportunity, Davis may have been able to show that emergency 
room nurses at Stroger Hospital are not expected to make the kind of 
speech that she made.183 If the court ever concludes incorrectly that a 
plaintiff spoke pursuant to her job, then it will have deprived that 
plaintiff of a fair resolution of her claim, leaving that plaintiff 
frustrated and distrustful of the court system. 
The Seventh Circuit’s conclusions in this area of law are 
problematic also because they are not convincing to a member of the 
public who reads the opinion. A reader who does not have the benefit 
of the entire record is left wondering whether the plaintiff’s job 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 See Doggett v. Cook Cnty., 255 F. App’x 88, 89 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“[N]othing in the record suggests that reporting perceived errors in the hospital’s 
administration is part of an [emergency room technician’s] official duties.”). 
182 See, e.g., Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2007). 
183 See Davis, 534 F.3d at 653–54. 
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actually included the duty to make the kind of speech at issue. Without 
the record or a factual finding about the plaintiff’s job duties, one 
cannot tell whether the court’s conclusion was correct. Therefore, it 
appears to the reader that the court’s conclusion could be incorrect, 
and that the court precluded the opportunity for the fact-finding that 
would have found the correct answer. This makes the court’s method 
of reaching its conclusion appear infirm. For these reasons, the 
Seventh Circuit would benefit its public employee free speech 
jurisprudence by recognizing that the question of what an employee’s 
job duties were is a question of fact. 
Contrary to what the Seventh Circuit has implied,184 the Garcetti 
Court did not hold that the question whether speech is made pursuant 
to an employee’s official duties is a question of law.185 Rather, in 
Garcetti, the Supreme Court did not need to decide whether the 
plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his job because the plaintiff 
agreed that it was.186 The Court noted that this case did not provide an 
“occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the 
scope of an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious 
debate.”187 That the Court might articulate such a framework in the 
future does not necessarily mean that that “framework” would be 
purely legal. 
The Court stated: 
 
The proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions 
often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee 
actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task 
in an employee's written job description is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is 
                                                 
184 Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“Garcetti . . . holds that before asking whether the subject-matter of particular 
speech is a topic of public concern, the court must decide whether the plaintiff was 
speaking ‘as a citizen’ or as part of her public job.” (emphasis added)). 
185 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006). 
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within the scope of the employee's professional duties for 
First Amendment purposes.188 
 
The reference to what an employee “actually is expected” to do 
suggests that the question of whether or not speech is protected could 
turn on the factual question of what an employee’s superiors expected 
of him. This is far from holding that a “court must decide” the 
question with no help from a fact-finder.189 
The Supreme Court has called the distinction between questions 
of fact and questions of law “vexing”190 and “elusive.”191 In one case, 
the Court stated that there was no “rule or principle that will 
unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion.”192 In 
distinguishing facts from law, the Court has described fact as that 
which can be found by “application of ordinary principles of logic and 
common experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of 
fact.”193 Justice Frankfurter defined facts as “basic facts . . . in the 
sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their 
narrators. . . .”194 Although the distinction is difficult to describe, 
reasonable people can generally tell the difference between what 
happened and the legal meaning of what happened. A jury finds the 
former, a court the latter. Whether or not a particular duty was part of 
an employee’s job is a question more like the former. 
 The Seventh Circuit has consistently interpreted Garcetti’s rule to 
mean that public employee speech is not protected if it was made as 
“part of” the job.195 According to this formulation, an employee spoke 
pursuant to his job where it was the employee’s duty to make the kind 
                                                 
188 Id. at 424–25. 
189 See Mills v. City of Evansville, Ind., 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2006). 
190 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). 
191 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). 
192 Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288. 
193 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 
(1984). 
194 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
195 E.g., Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1091 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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of speech at issue. For example, an employee’s job duties might 
include the duty to write memoranda, make statements, or report 
suspected misconduct. Under this formulation, employee speech is 
also made pursuant to the job where the employee spoke in order to 
further any of the employee’s other duties. Therefore, the factual 
questions are: (1) what were the plaintiff’s job duties?; and (2) did the 
employee speak because of those duties? A jury could easily find the 
answer to both of these questions. Ordinary people can understand that 
while someone may not have had a specific duty to make a particular 
statement, the person may have made the statement because of his job 
duties. 
In some cases, this change would affect only the reasoning of the 
opinion, not the outcome. As discussed above, in several public 
employee free speech cases, the Seventh Circuit may have come to its 
conclusion because the plaintiff employee failed to create a genuine 
issue of material fact on the issue of whether the plaintiff spoke 
pursuant to his job. Treating the question as a legal one, the court has 
stated that “it is clear” that the plaintiff spoke pursuant to his job.196 
Because it is not necessarily clear without factual findings, the court 
should state that it finds no genuine issue of material fact that would 
preclude summary judgment. This language would instruct litigants on 
what they must do to prevent summary judgment against them. This 
language would also alleviate the concern that the court may be 
jumping to incorrect factual conclusions. 
Even if the Seventh Circuit does not make this change on its own, 
litigants could lead the court to do so. A plaintiff who seeks to 
convince the Seventh Circuit that a question of fact exists should focus 
on presenting evidence that the job duties did not include making the 
speech at issue. The plaintiff should clearly identify what speech 
caused the retaliation and what the plaintiff’s job duties were. The 
plaintiff should bring to the court’s attention facts supporting the 
assertion that the speech did not help to fulfill any of the plaintiff’s job 
duties. This evidence should tend to show what was actually expected 
of the plaintiff. This could include evidence of the plaintiff’s daily 
                                                 
196 E.g., Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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activities as well as activities he performed infrequently; testimony 
that colleagues in the same position did not think that the plaintiff had 
a duty to make the kind of speech at issue; and statements by superiors 
that would show what the superiors expected. 
Armed with factual allegations that could prove that the speech 
was not made because of the plaintiff’s job duties, the plaintiff could 
convincingly argue that a court should not foreclose this factual 
question by granting summary judgment to the defendant. Faced with 
a dispute over specific facts, the Seventh Circuit might see the need to 
separate the factual question of what the job duties were from the 
larger question of whether the speech is protected. A factual dispute 
would remove the temptation for the court to draw its own conclusion 
from the facts.  
The court may hesitate to treat the question as a factual one 
because of the concern that introducing another factual question will 
lead to more trials, costs, and use of court resources.197 However, the 
resolution of the question of the plaintiff’s job duties using the fact-
finding process is worth the cost. Plaintiffs are not precluded from 
proving other kinds of facts simply because trials are expensive and 
hearings require court resources. This, just like any other kind of fact, 
must be found by giving both sides a fair opportunity to prove the 
facts on which their cases depend. 
The Seventh Circuit could hold, as the Tenth Circuit may have 
done, that the question whether a public employee spoke pursuant to 
his official duties is for the court to decide because it is a 
“constitutional fact.”198 The constitutional fact doctrine refers to a rule 
that an appellate court may make its own assessment of the facts when 
necessary to protect a constitutional right, even if that means 
disregarding a trial court’s finding of fact.199 The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that “in cases raising First Amendment 
issues . . . an appellate court has an obligation to make an independent 
examination of the whole record in order to make sure that the 
                                                 
197 See Smith, supra note 124, at 293. 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 121–23. 
199 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (9th ed. 2009). 
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judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression.”200 
 A holding that courts should decide this issue as a constitutional 
fact would explain the court’s reason for deciding this issue itself. This 
would be an improvement over an unexplained holding that the 
question is one of law apparently based on pre-Garcetti authority.201 
However, it is not clear that the constitutional fact doctrine applies to 
the public employee free speech cases that the Seventh Circuit has 
decided so far. First, the purpose of the appellate court’s independent 
assessment of the facts is to protect constitutional rights. This purpose 
does not explain the Seventh Circuit’s independent assessment of the 
facts in order to conclude that the speech at issue is not protected. 
Second, in cases where the Supreme Court has applied the 
constitutional fact doctrine, it independently assessed facts that had 
been found at trial.202 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has frequently 
decided that a plaintiff’s speech was not protected at the summary 
judgment stage.203 The problem here is not that the appellate court 
might disagree with the factual finding of a lower court; it is that the 
appellate court is making its assessment based on insufficient facts, 
and in doing so, it is foreclosing the opportunity for fact-finding. 
 The better view is to treat the plaintiff’s job duties as a question of 
fact for a fact-finder because in order to make a constitutional 
judgment, a court must know what the facts are—in this case, what 




After the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, public 
employees have no First Amendment right to free speech when they 
                                                 
200 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
201 See supra text accompanying notes 146–150. 
202 See, e.g., Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 493–98; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
141–42 (1983). 
203 See cases cited supra note 130. 
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490 
speak pursuant to their official duties. When a government employer 
punishes an employee because of her speech, the employee must 
establish that she was not speaking pursuant to her official duties in 
order to succeed in a § 1983 case against her employer. In the Seventh 
Circuit, public employees in this situation have faced a high hurdle 
because the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly decided that the speech at 
issue was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties as a matter 
of law, in the course of affirming summary judgment against the 
plaintiff. This reasoning fails to recognize the factual question of what 
exactly the employee’s job duties were. At the summary judgment 
stage, a plaintiff whose speech arguably was made pursuant to his job 
duties should take care to present the Seventh Circuit with evidence 
that will create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he spoke 
pursuant to his job duties. When a plaintiff does present the Seventh 
Circuit with such evidence, the court should hold that a fact-finder 
should resolve questions about the scope of the employee’s job. 
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